



California Community Reinvestment Corporation

# CCRC 2025 Tax Exempt Loan Portfolio Analysis

David Saltzman

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### Introduction


The CCRC 2025 Tax Exempt Loan Portfolio Analysis provides an in-depth review of CCRC’s portfolio of tax-exempt loans (TEs), including forward commitments, managed for a subset of its member banks under the "TEL Program." This report is primarily intended for the banks participating in the TEL Program. Formerly referred to as the "Bond Program," the TEL Program has been renamed to reflect updated financing structures, which are explained in subsequent sections.

The report focuses on the TELs funded by the banks participating in the TEL Program. It excludes (other than in Figure 1 below) TELs funded by Barings (formally the Cornerstone Fund), which CCRC originates and services but for which it does not have credit risk exposure. It also does not include TELs that CCRC services for investors. Unless otherwise noted, loan balances and commitment amounts are as of September 30, 2025.

CCRC launched the TEL Program in 1999, after seeing an opportunity to offer tax-exempt private placement bond financing to its affordable housing developers. CCRC models the TEL Program on its successful mortgage program, which finances a large share of the 9% LIHTC projects in California. Since approving its first TEL project in 2001, the program has grown significantly.

Figure 1 shows TEL financing approvals and fundings since 2001 and projected fundings of current forward commitments through 2029. In 2025, CCRC approved \$28.3 million in new TEL commitments.

**Figure 1: TEL Approvals and Fundings by Fiscal Year Since Program Inception (TEL Program & Barings)**



Funding dates after 2025 are projections reflecting current commitments. 2026 and 2027 figures may be different than figures presented in the 2024 TEL Portfolio Analysis due to revised projected funding dates.

## Program Overview

CCRC's TEL program employs a participation structure that allows participants in the TEL pool to receive tax-exempt interest in proportion to their interest in the pool.

The TEL structure, which is widely used by most banks as well as by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, is known as the back-to-back loan structure. Under this structure, a lender enters into a loan agreement with the government issuer, under which the issuer issues a governmental note to the lender. The proceeds from the governmental note provided by the lender are then loaned by the issuer to the project borrower through a Borrower Loan Agreement and Borrower Note, to finance the project development and loan. The issuer's rights under the Borrower Note and Loan are assigned to the lender and are secured by a first deed of trust on the project.

## S&P Rating

In summer 2021, CCRC engaged Standard & Poor's to provide a general obligation issuer credit rating (ICR). S&P's analysis reviewed CCRC's financial strength, business model, portfolio asset quality, and overall management and governance. S&P completed its review in September 2021, assigning an ICR of A+ stable. S&P reaffirmed CCRC's A+ stable rating in May 2025.

## 1. Characteristics of CCRC's TEL Portfolio

CCRC typically approves a TEL before the construction phase of a project. In this report, such approvals are referred to as "commitments" or "forward commitments." These commitments generally have a term of 30 to 36 months, allowing the developer sufficient time to construct the property and lease it to full occupancy.

Once the project is completed and achieves operational stability, CCRC fulfills the forward commitment by funding the TEL in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

### 1.1. Descriptive Statistics

Tables 1 through 4 summarize CCRC's TEL portfolio, book of forward commitments, and TEL origination activity over last six fiscal years.

Table 1 shows that in 2025, the TEL pool balance increased by approximately \$20 million to \$153.24 million. This reflects a continued upward trend over the past four years, following the low pool balance of \$18.45 million in 2022. The low in 2022 was due to the sale of 25 TELs totaling \$95 million to East West Bank (EWB) in August of that year. CCRC continues to service the TELs sold to EWB.

**Table 1: CCRC Portfolio of Funded TELs**

Fiscal Year	Loans <sup>1</sup>	Balance	Average	DUs Financed <sup>2</sup>	\$/DU	WAC <sup>3</sup>
2025	29	\$153,244,946	\$5,284,308	1,837	\$83,421	4.36%
2024	25	\$132,939,144	\$5,317,566	1,694	\$78,476	4.14%
2023	18	\$71,350,609	\$3,963,923	1,058	\$67,439	3.77%
2022	6	\$18,450,882	\$3,075,147	377	\$48,941	3.63%
2021	20	\$68,754,678	\$3,437,734	1,471	\$46,740	4.39%
2020	20	\$69,703,529	\$3,485,176	1,478	\$47,161	4.44%

<sup>1</sup>Projects with multiple loans are counted as having a single loan with a balance equal to the total balance of the combined tranches. <sup>2</sup>Dwelling Unit. <sup>3</sup>Weighted Average Coupon.

As part of our ongoing efforts to recycle TEL pool capital, CCRC conducts a TEL sale about every two to three years. In FY 2015 CCRC sold 21 TELs to Citibank totaling \$73 million, and in FY 2016 we sold 8 TELs totaling \$25.9 million. In 2019, CCRC completed a \$72.3 million TEL sale, selling 31 TELs (on thirty properties) from CCRC’s TEL pool into a securitization pool guaranteed by Freddie Mac.

In November 2023, CCRC closed on a \$100 million credit facility made available through the CDFI Bond Guarantee Program (BGP), which offers a capital recycling alternative to outright sales to third-party investors. Through December 2025, CCRC has drawn \$81.4 million from the BGP credit facility across three advances completed in October 2024, July 2025 and Dec 2025 respectively. In total, CCRC deployed \$40.2 million (\$28.9 million in FY 2025 and \$11.3 million in December 2025) from BGP to acquire eight loans from the TEL pool. This allowed CCRC to pay off the members of the TEL pool and transfer the TELs onto its own balance sheet.

**Table 2: TELs Funded 2020-2025<sup>1</sup>**

Fiscal Year	Loans	Balance	Average	DUs Financed	\$/DU	WAC
2025	7	\$41,847,969	\$5,978,281	451	\$92,789	5.50%
2024	7	\$63,200,326	\$9,028,618	636	\$99,372	4.55%
2023	12	\$53,407,735	\$4,450,645	582	\$91,766	3.82%
2022 <sup>1</sup>	10	\$46,555,043	\$4,655,504	664	\$70,113	3.87%
2021	1	\$3,316,451	\$3,316,451	70	\$47,378	4.49%
2020	7	\$30,257,645	\$4,322,521	452	\$66,942	4.67%

<sup>1</sup> Of the 10 TELs funded in 2022, CCRC sold six in the same fiscal year. These TELs, which were included in the EWB sale, had a combined principal balance of \$29.5 million at the time of sale, and a combined unit count of 437.

<sup>1</sup> Table 2 excludes two TELs totaling \$9.6 million that were originally funded by the TEL Pool. However, the TEL Pool was subsequently repaid using proceeds from the CDFI Bond Guarantee Program and, thereby, added to CCRC’s balance sheet. They were therefore included as fundings in the Loan Portfolio Analysis.

Table 2, which reviews CCRC TEL funding activity for the last six fiscal years, shows that CCRC funded 7 TELs in FY 2025 totaling \$41.8 million.

**Extensions of Forward Commitments**

Over the past six years, CCRC has experienced a significant increase in the number of projects seeking extensions of forward commitments due to delays in meeting funding conditions. These delays can be attributed to several factors, including:

- **Construction Delays:** Supply chain disruptions and labor shortages were among the primary contributors to construction interruptions during the COVID pandemic. Post-COVID, there continue to be delays caused by utility company delays in electrifying buildings and long waiting periods for switchgears. Rain delays impacted properties under construction in 2023 and 2024.
- **Special Needs Properties:** Properties serving homeless or other special needs populations often face slower lease-up periods due to:
  - Targeted outreach and referral requirements.
  - Complex, multi-level tenant screening processes.
  - Dependence on tenant referrals from housing and public health organizations administering local coordinated entry system programs.
- **Subordinated Debt Programs:** The increasing volume of subordinated debt programs and providers has added additional review and approval procedures to the loan conversion process, further contributing to delays.

The number of approved forward commitment extensions over the past six years is as follows<sup>2</sup>:

- **FY 2025:** 20 Extensions involving \$142.3 million in forward commitments.
- **FY 2024:** 12 extensions. involving \$74.4 million in forward commitments.
- **FY 2023:** 19 extensions, involving \$111.9 million in forward commitments.
- **FY 2022:** 16 extensions, involving \$76.4 million in forward commitments.
- **FY 2021:** 31 extensions.
- **FY 2020:** 36 extensions.

**Table 3: Book of TEL Forward Commitments**

Date	Count	Balance	Average	DUs Financed	\$/DU	WAC
2025	19	\$121,358,107	\$6,387,269	1,672	\$72,583	6.28%
2024	23	\$139,215,081	\$6,052,830	1,945	\$71,576	5.87%
2023	22	\$141,112,076	\$6,414,185	1,828	\$77,195	4.90%
2022	34	\$188,832,523	\$5,553,898	2,427	\$77,805	4.01%
2021	33	\$183,157,569	\$5,550,229	2,403	\$76,220	3.78%
2020	31	\$168,277,187	\$5,428,296	2,154	\$78,123	3.85%

Table 3 shows forward commitments CCRC has agreed to fund, subject to loan conversion requirements. Borrowers usually meet these requirements, so most of the forward commitments turn into funded loans. The number of forward commitments decreased from

<sup>2</sup> Extension totals include Loan Pool and Barings programs in addition to the TEL Pool.

\$139.21 million in 2024 to \$121.36 million in 2025, while the weighted average coupon (WAC) rose by 41 basis points to 6.28%.

**Table 4: New TEL Loan Approvals**

Date	Loans	Balance	Average	DUs Financed	\$/DU	WAC
2025	6	\$28,309,516	\$4,718,253	416	\$68,052	6.05%
2024	10	\$75,763,055	\$7,576,306	979	\$77,388	6.51%
2023	4	\$20,914,536	\$5,228,634	361	\$57,935	5.81%
2022	11	\$51,346,003	\$4,667,818	688	\$74,631	4.44%
2021	7	\$48,336,982	\$6,905,283	604	\$80,028	3.98%
2020	20	\$126,801,587	\$6,340,079	1,353	\$93,719	3.48%

As Table 4 shows, CCRC approved six TELs totaling \$28.31 million in FY 2025 with a WAC of 6.05%.

1.2. Geographic Distribution

Figure 2 compares the 2025 and 2024 geographic distributions of CCRC loans. Distributions, which include funded TELs and forward commitments, remain similar to 2024.

**Figure 2: Geographic Exposure by Region (funded TELs and forward commitments)**




Exhibit I (at the end of this report) shows CCRC TEL exposure by California County.

## 2. Portfolio Risk Factors

This section of the TEL Portfolio Analysis evaluates TEL portfolio risk factors. As in previous years, there were no loan delinquencies in FY 2025 (except for occasional borrower oversights). Therefore, we do not discuss delinquencies in our analysis.

### 2.1. Risk Metrics


Table 5 presents common risk metrics for funded TELs and forward commitments, with further stratification of funded TELs by geography. CCRC TEL proceeds typically cover a small fraction of a project's total development cost. In our experience, LIHTC equity investors and subordinate lenders typically supply about 80%-90% of the funding required to develop a project. This is a key reason for the impressive performance of CCRC loans. LIHTC investors also play a key role in making CCRC loans safe investments. These investors have the money and motivation to support struggling projects and have reliably stood behind properties on those rare occasions when general partners fail to provide needed support.

With a weighted average age of 21 months, most of the funded TELs in the portfolio are new. Among the 29 TELs in the pool, CCRC funded seven in 2025, seven in 2024 and a total of 26 between 2022 and 2025. There is only one "old" TEL, which we funded in 2003, with a remaining balance of \$290,000 at the close of FY2025. For four of the newer TELs, performance data reflect stabilized underwriting projections rather than actual results.

Funded TELs are \$32 million more than TEL forward commitments, with balances of \$153 million and \$121 million, respectively. However, the WAC of forward commitments is notably higher, at 6.28%, compared to 4.36% for funded TELs—a difference of 192 basis points.

The weighted average DSCR saw a sharp rebound from 1.13 in 2024 to 1.43 in 2025, reversing a 4-year-downward trend.

Three out of five underperforming loans (DSCR < 1.00) in FY 2024 showed year-over-year improvement, with an average DSCR increase of 0.17. Performance gains were even higher among well-performing loans: eleven out of seventeen loans with FY 2024 DSCRs above 1.00 reported higher DSCR in FY 2025, with an average increase of 0.49. Taken together, these results point to a broad-based improvement in portfolio performance rather than gains driven by a small number of outliers.



**Table 5: Risk Metrics by Coastal/Inland**

Risk Parameter	Coastal	Inland	Total	Forward Commitments
1. Count	21	8	29	19
2. Balance	\$130,949,188	\$22,295,759	\$153,244,946	\$121,358,107
3. \$/DU	\$92,872	\$52,215	\$83,421	\$72,583
4. WAC	4.37%	4.34%	4.36%	6.28%
5. DSCR	1.47	1.16	1.43	1.21
6. LTV	54%	46%	53%	50.3%
7. Occupancy	96%	93%	95%	N/A
8. Maturity	210	239	214	N/A
9. Age	19	28	21	N/A
10. Risk Rating	6.01	6.21	6.04	N/A
11. Loans >30 Yr Amort	11	3	14	12
\$ >30 Yr Amort	100,336,750	11,305,038	111,641,788	88,190,107
% \$ >30 Yr Amort	77%	51%	73%	73%
12. Loans <30 Yr Amort	9	4	13	5
\$ <30 Yr Amort	25,800,036	28,549,865	54,349,901	15,649,000
% \$ <30 Yr Amort	20%	128%	35%	13%
13. Loans =30 Yr Amort	1	1	2	2
\$ =30 Yr Amort	1,355,830	1,355,830	2,711,660	17,519,000
% \$ =30 Yr Amort	1%	6%	2%	14%

As averages, the indicators presented in Table 5 can conceal variances within the portfolio, masking risks that a more granular view of the portfolio can expose. Table 6 (an LTV-DSCR matrix) provides additional insights into the LTV and DSCR characteristics of CCRC TELs. The

matrix shows that the greatest vulnerabilities in the CCRC TEL portfolio involve low DSCRs. However, none of the properties have both low DSCR and high LTV.

In FY 2025, based on 2024 audits, six properties—representing \$10.8 million in combined loan balances—had DSCRs below 1.00. This accounted for 7.06% of the portfolio, a significant decrease from \$20.45 million in 2024, when seven properties comprising 20.45% of the portfolio had DSCRs below 1.00.

Among the six loans with DSCRs of less than 1.00, only one had an LTV greater than 70%, with the remaining five loans having LTVs of less than 50%. These low LTVs serve as a key risk mitigant. However, it is worth noting that these LTVs are based on original appraisals, which may not fully reflect current market values.


The graph below illustrates changes in the percentage of the portfolio with DSCRs below 1.0x since 2018. A notable decline in underperforming loans is observed in 2025. As discussed previously, several loans that were below the 1.0x threshold experienced DSCR improvement over the past year, lifting them above 1.0x. By comparison, CCRCs balance sheet portfolio, as reported in the Loan Portfolio Analysis, also recorded a reduction in sub-1.0x loans, though the change was more modest, declining from 19% to 17%.

This volatility is attributable in part to the relative newness of the TEL pool and its higher rate of churn. It is also a smaller portfolio, which means that changes in the performance of one or two loans can have a material impact in overall portfolio metrics. These characteristics make the TEL portfolio's performance metrics more susceptible to variability, or "lumpiness," compared to the larger more established and stable loan portfolio.

The performance data detailed in this table runs counter to the broader national trend. According to the Cohn Reznick 2025 Affordable Housing Credit Study, operating expenses for LIHTC properties increased by 6.9% between 2023 and 2024, and 23.4% of the national LIHTC portfolio operated below breakeven in 2024.

Although higher rents driven by rising AMIs have offset some of the inflation-driven expense increases, soaring insurance costs have overwhelmed property owners' ability to manage these challenges by boosting rents.


CCRC has conducted a comprehensive analysis of the factors driving current operating challenges at our properties. This analysis is summarized in the attached Portfolio Variance Report. The analysis, which reviews CCRC's entire \$1.3 billion servicing portfolio, includes a detailed review of income and operating expenses, as well as other key variables such as tenant demographics and property locations.



Looking again at Table 5, metric number 10 is the weighted average loan risk rating. Loan risk ratings, which CCRC assigns as prescribed in its Credit Policies and Procedures Manual, range from 6 (Pass) to 9 (Doubtful), with watch-rated loans assigned a 6.5 (or 6W). The FY 2025 aggregate risk rating was nearly identical to last year’s rating of 6.06. One loan received a rating of “7”, one received a rating of “8”, and two had ratings of “6W”.

Metric 11 in Table 5 reveals that 26 TELs—comprising 14 funded loans and 12 forward commitments—had amortization periods exceeding 30 years. The share of funded TELs with amortization periods exceeding 30 years increased modestly from 66% to 73%. This trend reflects the competitive landscape among affordable housing lenders, who are increasingly offering longer amortization periods to meet market demands.

At the same time, 18 TELs—13 funded loans and 5 forward commitments—had amortization periods of less than 30 years.



**Table 6: DSCR-LTV Matrix**

LTV	Less than 1.0x	1.00-1.14	1.15--1.29	1.30-1.49	1.50 to 1.79	Greater than 1.79	Total
0%--49.x%	9,364,348	-	26,040,017	5,803,988	10,638,867	10,350,771	62,197,992
50%-59.x%	-	-	26,041,119	-	9,101,776	7,959,312	43,102,208
60%-69.x	-	-	7,802,320	-	17,305,967	5,692,512	30,800,799
70%-79.x%	1,452,157	-	15,691,790	-	-	-	17,143,947
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,816,506</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>75,575,246</b>	<b>5,803,988</b>	<b>37,046,611</b>	<b>24,002,596</b>	<b>153,244,946</b>
	7.06%	0.00%	49.32%	3.79%	24.17%	15.66%	100.00%

2.2. Loan Concentrations

CCRC monitors its exposure to “sponsors” and LIHTC investors. These concentration levels are less critical for CCRC than they are for the assessment of traditional lending portfolios because almost all CCRC borrowers are stand-alone, single-asset entities that cannot provide cross-support to other properties. In addition, usually 90% of a LIHTC investor’s equity has been funded before a CCRC loan closes, and loans are non-recourse beyond real estate security.

Table 7 shows CCRC’s exposure to the top five sponsors--this year and last--as measured by loan balances and forward commitments. This year’s top-five list features the same sponsors as the 2024 list. CCRC’s total exposure to the top five sponsors was 47%, nearly identical to the 2024 level 45%.

**Table 7: CCRC Exposure to Sponsors (funded TELs and forward commitments)**

2025 Rank	Sponsor	2025 Exposure	% of Total Exposure	Number of Projects	2024 Exposure	2024 Rank
1	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	37,528,967	14%	3	32,893,731	1
2	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	26,568,866	10%	4	26,920,072	2
3	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	22,534,853	8%	3	17,964,874	5
4	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	21,654,243	8%	1	21,927,180	3
5	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	20,436,949	7%	3	20,586,007	4
		128,723,878	47%			45%

<sup>1</sup>2024 percentage of total exposure is based on 2024's top five sponsors.

Table 8 summarizes CCRC’s exposure to LIHTC investors, affiliates of which serve as investor limited partners of CCRC borrowers. In FY 2025, the top five investors accounted for 87% of CCRC’s total LIHTC investor exposure, up from 86% in 2024.

**Table 8: CCRC Exposure to LIHTC Investors (funded TELs and forward commitments)**

2025 Rank	Tax Credit Investor	2025 Exposure	% of Total Exposure	2024 Exposure	2024 Rank
1	Wells Fargo	126,575,430	46%	134,037,839	1
2	National Equity Fund	35,294,717	13%	28,221,899	4
3	U.S. Bank	32,829,546	12%	38,436,863	2
4	Bank of America	32,283,592	12%	23,969,410	3
5	Hudson Arrowhead	11,600,000	4%	n/a	n/a
		<b>238,583,284</b>	<b>87%</b>		<b>86%</b>

<sup>1</sup> 2024 percentage of total exposure is based on 2024's top five tax credit investors.

### 2.3. Risk Ratings

Figure 3 shows changes in the ratio of problem TELs (rated "7" and over) to total funded TELs. In 2024 there was three TEL with a rating of "7", no "8"-rated TELs and three loans on the watchlist. In 2025, the number of 7-rated loans decreased to one. There was one 8-rated loan, and two loans were on the watchlist. Although the problem loan ratio decreased from 2.22% to 1.20%, it is not particularly surprising given dominance of newly funded loans in the portfolio (See discussion in Section 2.1 Risk Metrics). Exhibit II provides additional details on CCRC's problem loans.

The prevalence of new loans also explains why some loans are rated as 6W, or "watchlist," rather than 7. According to our credit policies, the watchlist classification is typically applied for no more than 12 months. After this period, a property is either downgraded to a 7 rating if conditions have not improved or upgraded to a 6-pass rating if performance has stabilized.

For newly funded loans in their first or second year of stabilized operations, a subpar loan will often start with a 6W rating. If performance issues persist beyond the watchlist period, the loan will typically be downgraded to a 7 rating in the subsequent year.

**Figure 3: Problem TELs (FYs 2006-2025)**




Exhibit I: 2025 CCRC TEL Exposure by County

(Funded Loans and Forward Commitments)

County	CCRC Exposure	% of CCRC Exposure
Los Angeles	86,095,363	31.35%
San Diego	42,330,335	15.42%
San Francisco	31,308,875	11.40%
Alameda	29,745,856	10.83%
San Mateo	15,305,000	5.57%
Santa Clara	12,601,000	4.59%
Riverside	11,869,004	4.32%
Sacramento	11,396,877	4.15%
Ventura	9,377,249	3.41%
Solano	5,462,863	1.99%
Santa Cruz	4,812,402	1.75%
Sonoma	4,589,215	1.67%
Santa Barbara	2,729,000	0.99%
Napa	2,703,478	0.98%
Nevada	1,468,550	0.53%
Imperial	1,452,157	0.53%
Placer	1,355,830	0.49%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>274,603,053</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

Exhibit II: Criticized and Classified TEL Loans

Bond Loan Name	9/30/2025 Balance	Loan Class
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	290,000	7
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	1,468,550	8
Total	2,953,159	

# Appendix

## CCRC Operating Variance Report



California Community Reinvestment Corporation

# CCRC 2024 Portfolio Variance Analysis

David Saltzman  
Andy Hu  
9-17-2025



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## 1. Executive Summary

This report presents a variance analysis of operating performance across CCRC’s housing portfolio, with a focus on post-conversion trends. By comparing actual financial results to trended projections, we identify meaningful deviations in both income and expense patterns over time.

While most properties remain on a net-positive trajectory, with DSCRs above 1.0, a subset has shown signs of financial stress driven by rising costs, stagnant revenues, or both. We observe clear regional and structural patterns that help explain these outcomes.

These insights allow us to segment the portfolio by performance profile, surface emerging risks, and inform forward-looking strategy. They support ongoing efforts to refine underwriting practices, enhance risk management, and engage more proactively with sponsors, investors and government partners on targeted preservation initiatives.

Table 1 summarizes key drivers of underperformance in the three regions with the highest concentration and likelihood of underperforming properties.

**Table 1: Key Drivers of Underperformance**

	Bay Area	LA/Orange	Central Valley
<b>Income factors</b>			
High vacancy	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
High bad debt ratio <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Low rent growth	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
<b>Top expense factors</b>			
Utilities	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Maint./repair	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Insurance <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Security	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
Office cost		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Indicates our assessment that the risk is likely transitory or stabilizing

## 2. Methodology

To evaluate operating performance across CCRC’s portfolio, we use a variance analysis rather than tracking income and expenses on a more traditional per-unit basis. The variance approach provides a clearer understanding of performance drivers because it accounts for changes in portfolio composition and product type over time.

Although our portfolio is uniformly composed of affordable housing properties in California, product subtypes have shifted in recent years. For example, over the past five years, the share of supportive

housing properties in the portfolio increased significantly. Supportive housing properties have materially different cost structures from traditional affordable housing, particularly for service-related expenses, maintenance and repair, security, and operating subsidies.

A simple per-unit trend analysis would obscure these nuances, making it difficult to separate portfolio-mix effects from broader market or regulatory influences such as inflation, eviction moratoriums, or changes in subsidy levels. In contrast, a variance analysis—comparing actual results to trended underwriting projections prepared at the time of permanent conversion—helps us interpret the factors driving deviations in income and expense patterns and distinguish product-mix effects from market forces.

### 3. Operating Data Source

We reviewed operating data for 297 properties, representing approximately 70% of CCRC’s servicing portfolio. The data were accessed on March 18, 2025. To ensure reliable trend analysis, properties with fewer than two years of operating data were excluded. The included properties have operating histories ranging from 2 years to more than 20 years, with an average of 8 years.

Annual operating data was obtained from RealINSIGHT, CCRC’s asset management system, which tracks over 70 standardized income and expense categories. For each property, the dataset includes the original conversion underwriting as a baseline, followed by audited financials for each year of operation.

### 4. Portfolio Overview

Properties are grouped by both geographic region<sup>1</sup> and performance category, defined as:

- **Well-performing:** most recent DSCR  $\geq$  1.0
- **Underperforming:** most recent DSCR  $<$  1.0

**Table 2: Performance Category Summary**

	Under Performing	Well Performing	All
Years since Conversion	7.9	8	8
Number of Properties	76	221	297
Total Units	4,621	14,242	18,863
Average Size (units)	61	64	64

Three regions, LA/Orange, Bay Area, and Central Valley, account for over 80% of underperforming properties

<sup>1</sup> Defined by counties; see appendix

**Table 3: Regional Performance Summary**

Region	# of All Properties	% of All	# of Underperforming Properties	% of Underperforming	# of PSH Properties	High Risk Area
<b>LA/Orange</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>35%</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>47%</b>	19	⚠
<b>Bay Area</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>24%</b>	14	⚠
Central Coast	39	13%	4	5%	3	
San Diego	31	10%	1	1%	2	
<b>Central Valley</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9%</b>		⚠
Inland Empire	16	5%	5	7%		
Northern CA	12	4%	2	3%	1	
Sacramento	8	3%	3	4%		
Total	297	100%	76	100%	39	

Table 2 summarizes performance categories. In total 76 of 297 properties (26%) are underperforming based on DSCR. While underperformance appears in all regions, three regions stand out for their disproportionate share of underperforming assets:

- **LA/Orange:** 35% of total properties but 47% of underperformers
- **Bay Area:** 24% of both total and underperformers
- **Central Valley:** 6% of properties but 9% of underperformers

## 5. Variance Analysis Methodology

To better understand regional performance trends, we applied a variance analysis framework that compares actual operating results against projected benchmarks. This approach allows us to normalize differences in income restrictions and years in operation, making cross-property comparisons more meaningful.

**Definition:** Variance is defined as the percentage difference between actual performance and projected performance since conversion.

### Underwriting Assumptions

Current underwriting practices use annual growth rates of 2% for income and 3% for expenses across all properties. These serve as baseline projections. For example, if a property converted in 2019, we would project a 10.4% increase in income and a 15.9% increase in expenses by 2024 (five years of compounded growth). We then measure how actual performance compares to these benchmarks.

### Portfolio Case Example

The example below illustrates our methodology as applied to a single property.




**Property:** 44-unit Family Housing development in Koreatown, Los Angeles  
**Recent DSCR:** 0.98  
**Year of Conversion:** 2014

In this example, audited financials were available from 2016 to 2023. Figure 1 shows that the property had a positive income variance of 15%, indicating actual income exceeded our projected income by that amount.

However, consistent with broader portfolio trends, the property experienced elevated expense variance of 41%, driven by inflationary pressures and rising operating costs. As a result, its DSCR declined from 1.16 (in 2014) to 0.98 (in 2023) despite the income gains.


**Figure 1: The Serrano Apartments, Variance Trend 2014 – 2023**




### Regional Mapping

To pinpoint drivers of underperformance, we compare underperforming properties with well-performing properties in the same region, analyzing both effective gross income (EGI) and expense variance.

**Figure 2: Average Expense Variance by Region**



**Figure 3: Average EGI Variance by Region**



*Note: Effective Gross Income (EGI) reflects net rental income after vacancy and bad debt.*

Figure 3 shows significant EGI variance gap between well-performers and underperformers. In LA/Orange, for example, well-performing properties achieved an average EGI variance of 26.6%, versus 6.4% for underperformers—a roughly fourfold difference. Figure 2 shows that underperformers have higher expense variances, but compared to EGI variance, the difference is less severe (37.3% for underperformers vs 23.3% for well-performers).

**Implication to Underwriting**

Across 297 properties reviewed, EGI increased by approximately 4% per year on average and expenses grew by 6% per year, roughly twice the 2%/3% increases assumed in underwriting. Had we assumed 4% for income and 6% for expenses, forecasts would have more closely aligned with actual performance.

### Regional Characteristics

The three high-risk regions (LA/Orange, Bay Area, Central Valley) account for 80% of underperformers. In these regions, underperformers show at least a 10% variance gap in either expense or income compared to well performers.

**Table 4: Underperformance Pattern by Region**

Region	Expense Challenge	Income Challenge
Bay Area	☑	☑
LA/Orange	☑	☑
Central Valley	☑	

Other regions with fewer properties lack sufficient data points for meaningful comparisons. For instance, in San Diego, only one of the 31 properties is underperforming.


## 6. Income Driver Breakdown

As noted above, EGI variance was positive in all regions, meaning actual EGI exceeded underwriting projections. Underperformance, therefore, was less about absolute EGI levels and more about whether EGI growth was sufficient to offset rising expenses.

To understand why EGI kept up with expense growth in some cases but not in others, we examined the discrete components of EGI: gross potential income, vacancy, and bad debt. We conclude that *bad debt and rent growth* are the primary contributors to the income gap.


Vacancy

**Figure 4: 2024 Vacancy Rate by Performance**



In 2024, our portfolio had an average vacancy rate of 2.5%, well below the standard underwriting assumption of 5%. According to Figure 4, The LA/Orange region, which contains CCRC's largest concentration of loans, had a vacancy rate around 2.1%, consistent with the portfolio average. The Bay Area is the only region where the underperformers exceed the 5% benchmark. This suggests that vacancy loss isn't a primary driver of underperformance, in most regions.

**Figure 5: 2024 Vacancy Rate Breakdown by PSH Status**



Properties in our portfolio with Permanent Supportive Housing (PSH) units are typically mixed tenancy, with a blend of PSH and non-PSH units. For these properties, we typically apply a 10% vacancy rate to PSH units and a 5% vacancy rate to non-PSH units. Resulting in an average blended underwritten vacancy of 6.4% for PSH properties. <sup>2</sup>

Figure 5 shows that vacancy rates at PSH properties are typically higher than those at non-PSH properties, supporting the policy of applying elevated vacancy assumptions to PSH units. Except in Northern California, PSH vacancies ranged from two to four times those of non-PSH peers.


**Bad Debt**

**Table 5: Average Bad Debt as % of GPI in 2024**


Group	# of Property	Property (≥ 1% Bad Debt)	%	Bad Debt as % of GPI
Underperforming	76	37	49%	3.6%
Well-Performing	221	51	23%	0.8%

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix for PSH Definition

**Figure 6: Bad Debt as % of GPI by Performance**



**Figure 7: Bad Debt as % of GPI by PSH Status**



*Note: Gross Potential Income (GPI) reflects rental income assuming no vacancies or bad debt.  
Bad Debt reflects rental arrears that have since been deemed uncollectable.*


Figure 6 shows that in most regions, bad debt impacts underperformers more than well-performers. Table 5 shows that on average, underperformers lost about 3.6% of GPI to bad debt versus 0.8% for well-performers—over four times as much. We typically do not explicitly underwrite bad debt; instead, we imbed bad debt within the vacancy assumption.

Historically, bad debt had only a minimal impact on financial performance. However, in recent years it has grown more material, largely due to pandemic-era eviction moratoriums that limited enforcement of rent payment obligations. As these protections expire and tenant payment patterns normalize, we expect bad debt levels to decline substantially.

According to Figure 7, PSH properties do not appear to exhibit systematically higher bad debt, likely due to vouchers and other subsidy support.

## Rent Growth

**Figure 8: Average GPI Annual Growth Rate by Performance**




*Note: Gross Potential Income (GPI) captures the maximum possible rental income before vacancy or bad debt, making it a direct proxy for rent levels charged.*

Figure 8 shows well-performers achieved notably higher rent growth in regions such as the Bay Area, LA/Orange, Central Coast, and Northern California. On average, rents at well-performers grew by about 4.5% per year, compared with 2.9% for underperformers. Due to compounding, this 1.6 percentage-point difference translates to roughly 16% higher income over an eight-year period—enough to materially affect DSCR. The 4.5% annual rent growth among well-performing properties aligns with Novogradac’s findings<sup>3</sup>, which report a 5.6% statewide annual rent increase in California since 2016.

<sup>3</sup> Novogradac 2024 LIHTC Income and Operating Expenses Report

**Figure 9: Average GPI Annual Growth Rate by PSH Status**



PSH properties show mixed GPI growth trends across regions (Figure 9). In the Bay Area and LA/Orange, PSH properties exhibit slightly lower rent growth than non-PSH peers, while the Central Coast and San Diego show significantly stronger GPI growth among PSH properties.

**Summary**

The following chart illustrates how vacancy and bad debt have offset rent growth among underperformers.

**Figure 10: GPI Growth vs. Vacancy and Bad Debt (Underperforming Properties)**




Figure 10 decomposes EGI variance into three core drivers: rent growth, vacancy, and bad debt. As we discussed earlier, bad debt is included in our 5% vacancy assumption. Therefore, if actual Vacancy and Bad Debt ( + ) add to more than 5%, it will erode GPI and lead to a lower EGI Variance.

**Figure 11: Average EGI Variance (Underperforming Properties)**





Figure 11 presents EGI as the net outcome of the GPI trends shown in Figure 10. In the Bay Area, for example, EGI variance is -2.2% despite a positive 3.2% GPI variance. This reflects a combination of limited rent growth and drag from Vacancy + Bad Debt (together about 12%). By contrast, Central Valley shows strong EGI Variance due to relatively low vacancy and bad debt levels.

## 7. Expense Driver Breakdown

### Overview

**Figure 12: Average Total Expense Annual Growth Rate**



Across most regions, underperforming properties show faster expense growth than well-performers. Even a 1% annual difference compounds into substantial cost gaps over time. For example, in LA/Orange, a 1.5% annual growth differential results in a 18% higher expense level over eight years.

The Bay Area and Central Valley stand out as particularly expense-burdened regions, both in absolute growth rates and in the underperformer/well-performer gap.

Novogradac reported a 6.6% annual growth rate<sup>4</sup> for operating expenses in California since 2016. Within our portfolio, underperformers averaged 7.1% annual growth, well-performers 5.3%, and the overall portfolio 5.8%.

### High Impact Expense Categories

Now we rank common high impact expense items among **underperforming properties** in the three high-risk areas.

**Table 6: High Impact Expense Category (Underperforming Properties): Variance over Conversion Projections.**

<b>Line Item Operating Cost Variance</b>	<b>Bay Area</b>	<b>LA/Orange</b>	<b>Central Valley</b>
<i>Total Utilities</i>	12.0%	8.4%	5.1%
<i>Maint./Repair</i>	6.5%	10.1%	16.6%
<i>Prop &amp; Liability Ins</i>	6.0%	6.8%	5.7%
<i>3rd Party Security</i>	2.4%	1.1%	0.4%
<i>Main &amp; Janitor</i>	2.0%	1.4%	1.4%
<i>Salary: Ast Mgr./Leasing</i>	1.8%	0.2%	0.0%
<i>Office Costs</i>	1.4%	2.5%	3.5%
<i>Other</i>	6.2%	6.1%	15.2%
<b>Total Expenses Variance</b>	<b>38.3%</b>	<b>36.4%</b>	<b>47.5%</b>
<b>Average Years of Operation</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>

*These properties range from 2 – 20 years of operation*

*All line items' variance adds up to the total expense variance. E.g. a utilities variance of 12% in the Bay Area means it has increased total expense by 12% over projection*

Across all three regions, **Utilities, Maintenance & Repair, and Property & Liability Insurance** consistently emerge as the top three drivers of expense variance, accounting for approximately 60–70% share of expense variance among underperformers (Table 6). In the Bay area, total expenses are on average 38.3% higher than projected, with utilities alone accounting for 12% of the increase beyond projections.

<sup>4</sup> Novogradac 2024 LIHTC Income and Operating Expenses Report

### Security Costs

In the **Bay Area**, security costs stand out as an unexpected contributor to expense variance. However, this issue affects a relatively small number of properties. Eleven out of seventy properties in this region spent more than 2% of GPI on security, averaging \$140,000 per property (range: \$30,000-\$350,000)—and in increase of roughly 112% from underwriting levels.

### Office Costs


In LA/Orange and Central Valley, office expenses show unusually high variance, suggesting heightened administrative expense growth at the property level (Table 7). This category encompasses multiple line items (e.g. salaries, benefits, supplies, management fees and technology services). Additional analysis will be required to disaggregate these components and identify the principal drivers of the increases, but early indications suggest that salaries—a significant line item within this category—area key contributor, especially in high-cost labor markets such as the Bay Area and Los Angeles.

**Table 7: Office Expense per Unit by Region (Underperforming Properties)**

	Conversion	Now	Change
Bay Area	\$487	\$692	42%
Central Valley	\$157	\$387	147%
LA/Orange	\$325	\$594	83%

### Utilities

**Figure 13: Average Total Utilities Expense / Unit**



Average utility costs per unit have grown modestly and steadily portfolio-wide (Figure 13), but with significant variation at the regional level. In the Bay Area, utilities represent the largest single driver of expense variance, significantly outpacing the other two regions (Table 8). Primary cost pressures come from water and sewer, and trash, which have seen the steepest increases (Figure 14). Electricity--


typically limited to common areas since tenant usage is billed directly--has grown more in line with general inflation. The Installation of solar panel for many properties in our portfolio also contributed to electricity usage saving. Gas spending is flat to negative In the Bay Area and Central Valley (suggesting reduced usage), but remains elevated in LA/Orange, pointing to operational differences or higher consumption.

**Table 8: Average Utilities Expense / Unit (Underperforming Properties)**

	Conversion	Now	Change
Bay Area	\$2,311	\$4,383	90%
Central Valley	\$933	\$1,420	52%
LA/Orange	\$1,278	\$2,386	87%

Table 8 shows that, on average, Bay Area properties have significantly higher utilities expense per unit compared with the other two regions. Figure 14 illustrates the growth of individual utility categories since conversion, highlighting that tenant-driven utilities such as gas, water/sewer, and trash exhibit the greatest regional differences.

**Figure 14: Utilities Expense % Change Breakdown**



Primary cost pressures come from water and sewer, and trash, which have seen the steepest increases (Figure 14). **Electricity**--typically limited to common areas since tenant usage is billed directly--has grown more in line with general inflation. The Installation of solar panels for many properties in our portfolio also contributed to electricity usage saving. **Gas** spending is flat to negative In the Bay Area and Central Valley (suggesting reduced usage), but remains elevated in LA/Orange, pointing to operational


differences or higher consumption. **Water & Sewer** experienced the highest rate of increase. Since water usage is mostly tenant-driven but property-paid, issues like leaky fixtures and inefficient consumption habits can significantly drive up costs.

### Property Insurance

Between 2019 and 2024, average insurance cost per unit increased by roughly 150%, rising from about \$400 to \$1,000 per unit (Figure 15). Underperformers experienced about twice the annual insurance-cost growth of well-performers (Table 8). Well-performing properties in the Central Valley saw the lowest insurance-cost growth among the three focus regions.

PSH properties were underwritten with higher insurance costs and remain more expensive to insure despite being newer assets (Table 9). Looking ahead to 2025 and beyond, PSH insurance costs may face further increases as insurers apply higher risk assessments to this asset type.

**Figure 15: Average Property Insurance Expense / Unit**



**Table 9: Property Insurance Expense / Unit in 2024**


	<i>Underperforming</i>	<i>Annual Growth Rate</i>	<i>Well-Performing</i>	<i>Annual Growth Rate</i>
<i>Bay Area</i>	\$2096	17%	\$796	10%
<i>Central Valley</i>	\$693	12%	\$419	4%
<i>LA/Orange</i>	\$1038	21%	\$821	12%
<b>Total</b>		<b>19%</b>		<b>10%</b>

**Table 10: Property Insurance Expense / Unit (PSH VS Non-PSH)**

	Non PSH	PSH
Conversion	\$397	\$622
Now	\$936	\$1,003
Yrs of Operation	9	4

**Maintenance and Repair**

**Figure 16: Average Maintenance and Repair Expense / Unit**



**Table 11: Maintenance and Repair / Unit**

	Underperforming	Well-Performing	Non-PSH	PSH	All
Bay Area	\$1,217	\$874	\$996	\$830	\$963
Central Valley	\$1,240	\$904	\$1,035		\$1035
LA/Orange	\$1,315	\$949	\$1,075	\$1,084	\$1077


Please note that references to 'Maintenance and Repair' in this section refer solely to the designated line item, and should not be confused with the summary figure 'Total Maintenance and Repair'.

Maintenance and repair costs per unit are 30–40% higher among underperformers than well-performers. In the Bay Area, PSH properties show slightly lower maintenance costs than non-PSH, while in LA/Orange, they are roughly equal—despite being newer on average. This pattern suggests that PSH properties may experience higher wear and tear. As with Office costs, further disaggregation will clarify the specific drivers within the broader Maintenance & Repair category.

## 8. Future Scenario Analysis

We believe the elevated bad debt levels are likely temporary and expect them to revert to historic norms. While we have less certainty regarding property insurance costs, we are hopeful they will stabilize and decline significantly. Accordingly, we modeled a scenario to assess the impact on our portfolio if both factors improve. Specifically, the scenario assumes a 95% reduction in bad debt and a 20% reduction in property insurance costs relative to the amounts reported in the 2024 financial statements, holding all other factors constant.

**Figure 16: Scenario Analysis**



Under these assumptions, the number of underperforming loans would fall from 76 to 59, and average DSCR would increase from 0.41 to 0.67 (Figure 16).

## 9. Conclusion & Recommendations

**Table 12: Key Drivers of Underperformance**

	Bay Area	LA/Orange	Central Valley
<b>Income factors</b>			
High vacancy	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
High bad debt ratio <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Low rent growth	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
<b>Top expense factors</b>			
Utilities	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Maint./repair	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Insurance <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Security	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
Office cost		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Indicates our assessment that the risk is likely transitory or stabilizing

Our analysis identifies differences in the key drivers of underperformance and highlights income and expense line items underestimated in their potential to escalate. Some findings--such as rising insurance costs--were expected. Others were unexpected; for example, the Bay Area exhibits both the highest average vacancy rates and unusually high tenant-driven utilities (water/sewer). Office costs also show significant variance, suggesting the administrative burden of operating these properties has been underestimated.

### Implications for Underwriting

- Incorporate elevated expense assumptions into sensitivity testing and stress scenarios.
- Consider stress testing scenarios that apply 4% and 6% income and expense escalators.

In future reports, we plan to further disaggregate composite expense categories to pinpoint specific drivers. For example, office costs could be separated into staff-related expenses versus technology or service contracts.

On the income side, our analysis highlights how bad debt and stagnant rent growth are undermining effective gross income. As a next step, we plan to investigate whether higher vacancies in mixed-tenancy PSH properties are concentrated in PSH-designated units and whether the presence of PSH units in mixed-tenancy properties is affecting occupancy in non-PSH units. We also aim to assess the influence of tenant acuity levels and the role of local agencies in administering coordinated entry systems.

We will also explore whether stagnant rent growth reflects sponsor decisions or external constraints, such as regulatory limitations tied to government loan programs.

By diagnosing these operating challenges in greater detail, we will be better positioned to engage government agencies, lending institutions, and other affordable housing stakeholders with evidence-based recommendations—strengthening CCRC’s role in advancing policies and practices that support the long-term sustainability of affordable housing operations.

## 10. Appendix

### Region Definition

<u>County</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>County</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>County</u>	<u>Region</u>
Alameda	Bay Area	Inyo	Central Valley	Monterey	Central Coast
Alpine	Sacramento	Kern	Central Valley	Napa	Bay Area Northern
Amador	Sacramento	Kings	Central Valley	Nevada	CA
Butte	Northern CA	Lake	Northern CA	Orange	LA/Orange Northern
Calaveras	Sacramento	Lassen	Northern CA	Placer	CA Northern
Colusa	Northern CA	Los Angeles	LA/Orange	Plumas	CA Inland
Contra Costa	Northern CA	Madera	Central Valley	Riverside	Empire
Del Norte	Northern CA	Marin	Bay Area	Sacramento	Sacramento Central
El Dorado	Sacramento	Mariposa	Central Valley	San Benito	Valley Inland
Fresno	Central Valley	Mendocino	Northern CA	San Bernardino	Empire
Glenn	Northern CA	Merced	Central Valley	San Diego	San Diego
Humboldt	Northern CA	Modoc	Northern CA	San Francisco	Bay Area Central
Imperial	San Diego	Mono	Central Valley	San Joaquin	Valley
<u>County</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>County</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>County</u>	<u>Region</u>
San Luis Obispo	Central Coast	Trinity	Northern CA	Sierra	Northern CA Northern
San Mateo	Bay Area	Tulare	Central Valley	Siskiyou	CA
Santa Barbara	Central Coast	Tuolumne	Central Valley	Solano	Bay Area
Santa Clara	Bay Area	Ventura	Central Coast	Sonoma	Bay Area Central
Santa Cruz	Central Coast	Yolo	Sacramento	Stanislaus	Valley
Shasta	Northern CA	Yuba	Sacramento	Sutter	Sacramento Northern
				Tehama	CA

### Permanent Supportive Housing (PSH) Definition

Permanent Supportive Housing (PSH) provides long-term affordable housing linked with supportive services. CCRC classifies a property as PSH if it includes at least one unit with regulatory restrictions serving populations such as individuals experiencing homelessness, persons with disabilities, transition-age youth, or those with special needs.

### Utility Cost / Unit Breakdown (Underperformers)

		Gas	Electricity	Water+Sewer	Trash
Bay Area	Conversion	\$280	\$384	\$998	\$650
	Now	\$284	\$521	\$2,469	\$1,108
LA/Orange	Conversion	\$207	\$386	\$479	\$206
	Now	\$337	\$517	\$1,069	\$474
Central Valley	Conversion	\$81	\$186	\$464	\$203
	Now	\$38	\$242	\$865	\$272

### Insurance Cost /Unit (All Properties)

